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CÉCILE DE TERWANGNE/SOPHIE LOUVEAUX
Der vorliegende Artikel m6chtenicht die Gesamtheit des
von der Richtlinie vorgesehenen Schutzsystems vorstel-
len. Er m6chte vielmehr die spezifische Frage der An-
wendung dieses europaischen Textes im Rahmen des
Internet beleuchten. Zu diesem Zwecke wird var allem
aufzwei Punkte nahereingegangen: Zuerst wird die The-
matik der materiellen Anwendung der Richtli(1ie disku-
tiert. Dies führt dazu, die wesentlichen Definitionen der
Richtlinie in den Kontext des Internet zu setzen. An-
schlieBend wird die territoriale Anwendung der Richtlinie
sowie die hiermit untrennbar verbundene Problematik
der grenzüberschreitenden Datenf/üsse behandelt.
1. Introduction
The "information highway" creates threats and challenges
in relation to the protection of personal data. Privacy was
once defined as "You know it when you lose it". The
threats online networks create for privacy are not properly
measured by the information highway users. Users do not
realize that privacy is at stake. Action must be undertaken
to render the user aware of the reality and to address the
dangers with concrete and practical solutions so as to
avoid the possibility that the user, in order to protect his
privacy, si mply logs off the network.
Certain dangers can be easily identified. It is cleat that on-
line services expand the volume of personal data at stake.
Moreover consumers become increasingly remote from
organizations which process their data. Different categor-
ies of actors 'intervene in the online game (mainly access
providers and information or service providers) and actors
have become increasingly numerous (the Internet consists
is more than 40 million users throughout the world acces-
sing more than 4 million Internet sites). Such a situation di-
lutes the responsibility for data security and data protecti-
on and multiplies the risk of breaches in security and pro-
tection. What is more, the security concern is increased by
the fact that multimedia technologies offer higher risks of
distortion of reality. Digitalization enables to obtain the
picture of two persons side by side even though they have
never actually met.
Moreover, the Net facilitates the quick transmission of in-
formation to any other computer system connected to the
network. Personal data (even sensitive data such as data
about health, political opinions or religious convictions)
can be communicated to countries without an adequate
data protection level. The transmission which was once
mai n Iy active: it was the data subject who decided to trans-
fer certain information, becomes more and more passive:
information is made available but one does not know to
whom, where to and to what purpose.
Other risks, less evident but equally real, exist. Unlike the
traditional and isolated database, the international dimen-
sion of the network entails the possibility of an intercon-
nection between information located in different places
and provided for various purposes. The danger lies in that
it is technically feasible to gather ail the personal data rela-~
1) See"Data Protection on the Internet: Report and Guidance", adopted atthe
20th meeting of the International Working Group on Data Protection in Tele-
communications in Berlin, 19.11.1997.
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ted to a given individual that are present on the Net. Search
engines using robots to rake the network and to create in-
dexes render it possible to search for any occurrence of a
name anywhere inthetextof anyWeb page or in any news
posting. One can thus achieve a comprehensive profile of
a person (and know for example that he has written articles
against nuclear tests, that he is presently unemployed and
looking for a job -he made his curriculum vitae available
-and that he is involved in newsgroup discussions
concerning gay issues). Even if the information was made
publicly available by the us,er by putting it in public areas
of the network, the user does not necessarily expect his
w,hole life story or personality to be reconstituted, or his
messages to newsgroups to be read by anyone outside
those with whom he shares a common interest, or -even
more preoccupying -he does not expect the information
to be used for purposes completely divergent from the in-
itiai purpose for which it was provided for.
The last data protection concern we will mention derives
from the fact that the use of Internet services is not anony-
mous.
Internet services generally work with point-to-point con-
nections. A certain amount of information is necessary in
order to establish the transmission in itself and to bill the
service rendered. Every electronic mail message contains
a header with information about the sender and the reci-
pient of the message (name and mail address, time of mail-
ing, etc.), information will be recorded as to the timing of
the message, the length oftime of the communication, etc.
The use of the network generates personal data relating to
the users. Users are bound to leave an electronic trace
which can be used to develop a profile of personal inter-
ests and tastes. The information behaviour of the senders
and recipients can be traced and supervised at least by the
service provider to whom the information is transmitted.
The more the Internet is used for commercial purposes, the
more interesting it will be for service providers and other
bodies to get as much transaction-generated data about
the users of the net. A number of apparently casual uses of
the Net will be able to be linked together to create a very
complete personal profile of the individual concerned. In-
dividual A orders a pizza via the Net (this reveals not only
his taste for Italian food, but will also reveal data concern-
ing the time of the use of the service enabling localization
of the individual); he then fills up at a petrol station using
his credit card; makes a booking for a late night movie, etc.
Three types of approaches can be envisaged. The first is gi-
yen by security technologies; 1 the second co mes from ano-
MMR 9/1998
Terwangne/louveaux: Data Protection
nymity (encryption and privacy enhancing technologies)
and a third is expressed in data protection rules. As the two
first solutions involve mostly, if not only, technical ingre-
dients, they will not be retained for this paper.2 We will li-
mit our analysis to the data protection rules.
A particular legal instrument deserves a special attention
since it is the last-born in the family, hence supposed to be
the most advanced. Moreover it is legally binding and it
has a particularly wide scope: the European Data Protecti-
on Directive.
Il. Protection afforded by the European
Directive
The European Oirective3 on the protection qf individua!s
with regard to the processing of persona! data and on the
free movement of su ch data4 was adopted on 24.10.1995.
This text lays down a number of principles with regard to
the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natura! persons and in particular their right toprivacy with
respect to the processing of personal data. The Member
States are required to transpose these principles into their
nationallegislation within a time !imit of three years from
the date of ils adoption (i.e. by the 24.10.1998).
or E-mail address. The latter can then "put a name" on the
IP address and follow the persan during ail his operations.
Data revealing the identification of the data user could be
rendered anonymous in the eyes of the recipient of the
message via the service access provider (introduction of a
code of access ratherthan his name, forexample). This do-
es not, however, mean that the Directive is no longer ap-
plicable.
To determine whether a persan is "identifiable", account
should be taken of aIl the means reasonably likely to be
used by the controller, or by any other persan, to identify
the said person.7ldentification can therefore be carried out
either by the controller or by any other persan. However,
in the latter case, since the data must be considered as
relating to an "identifiable" persan in the eyes of the con-
troller, there must be at least a link (contractual, institutio-
nal, or any other reasonable link) between the controller
and the persan who holds the key for identification.
Personal data contained in the actual content of the mes-
sage
This data can relate to the sender of the message himself:
he is requested to provide certain personal details in order
toobtain a service or information. Forexample, if he wants
to obtain some marketing material through the post, the
sender may be requested to give his name, address, etc.
The data can also relate to a third party to the transmission:
an information provider makes available a list of data ab-
out certain persans (a directory service, for example). ln or-
der to book a flight for his client, a travel agent must intro-
duce the client's name, address and could also include in-
formation that will reveal certain preferences (smoker or
non-smokerh way of life (vegetarian or not) and some sen-
sitive data such as Muslim, diabetic or handicapped. The
data is sometimes made avai lable by the data subject him-
self who actually seeks a certain form of pub.licity of hisda-
ta (an author who wants to make public his latest work, an
employment seeker who desires to make known his curri-
culum vitae via the Internet).
1. Definitions and Identification
The protection afforded bythe Directive applies tothe pro-
cessing of personal data. One of the first diffiFulties enco-
untered when trying to apply the Directive to online net-
works is to effectively determine when one can consider
personal data as being processed.
b) Processing
The definition of "processing" in Article 2 of the Directive
is ~11-encompassing: any operation carried autan personal
data, whether or not by automatic means, is covered by the
term. The Directive identifies in a non-exhaustive way so-
me oftheoperations to which it is applicable.lt is therefore
possible to say that as soon as data are collected, any use8
including collection itself, ofsuch data is an integral part of
the processing covered by the Directive. The absence of a
distinction between the stages of data collection, use and
a) Personal data
The Direçtive adopts a very broad definition of the term
"personal.data" so as to include any information re1ating to
an identified or identifiable person ("data subject"). The
person may be "directly" identified (by reference to his na-
me, for example) or can be "indirectly" identified by refer-
ence to specific characteristics of that person, in particular
by reference to an identification number, or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, psychological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity. Could, therefore, re-
ference to a bank account number, a holiday reservation,
fingerprints etc., be considered as "personal data".
Personal data in the form of sounds or images are also co-
vered bythe Directive.5 This provision is an importantstep
towards the adaptation of processingrules to new techno-
logies and to multimedia applications. ,
i
We are able to identify two types of personal ~ata with re-
gard to the use of the Internet: 1
User related data
As already said above, users inevitably leave an electronic
tracewhen enteringthe Net. This trace takes the form of an
IP address, i.e. a seri es ofnumbers.ltallows the message to
reach the desired point of the Net and the information to
co me backto the user's computer. Such a trace, in se, only
reveals the identity of the access provider6 but not that of
the user. The access provider is the onewht> can link the IP
address to an identified perso~ or computer (i~a company,
for example,. he knows who IS the owner of t e computer
but notwho is the user). Very often, however, he user is as-
ked by the information or service provider to ive his name
2) On anonymityîn networks see "Privacy enhancing technologies, the path
to anonymity", Registratiekamer, The Netherlands & Information and Privacy
Commissionner/Ontario, Canada, August 1995. On security and technologi-
cal solutions (such as PICS, secure-viewing,...) see Joel Reidenberg, "Gover-
ning Networks and Cyberspace rule-making", 45 Emory Law Journal, 1996.
3) Reference in this article is only made tothe general directive on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movementof such data ratherthan to sectorspecific directives such as the
directive (still to be adopted) concerning the processing of personal data and
the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, in particular in in-
tegrated services digital network (ISDN) and in thé public digital mobile net-
works.
4) EU Directive95/46,0.J.,23.11.95,L281/31.
5) Recitals 14 and 15.
6) For a definition of the access provider see part "11.1 c) Controller".
7) 26 of the Directive recitals.
8) ln the broad sense of the term. "Use" of data is included as such ln the list
of operations enumerated in Article 2.b.
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terial operationconstitutes the processing of personal data
as such.
The Directive will not apply to the processing of data by a
natural person in the course of a purely personal or house-
hold activity (Article 3.2.). Home users of the Internet, in
particular, might obtain and use the personal data for a
purely personal or household activity (e.g. hobbies or the
organization of a private meeting); the principles laid
down bythe Directivewill therefore notapply in these par-
ticular cases. The personal nature of the activities mentio-
ned above are evident. However, this is not always the ca-
se (is the collection and use of personal data for a universi-
ty thesis, or the access an employee has to the Internet
through his office computer and the server of the compa-
ny, for example, to be considered as a personal or profes-
sional activity?).
c) Controller
According to Article 2.d of the Directive, the controller is
the natural or legal persan, public authority, agencyorany
other body which alone or jointly with others determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.
The text designates the controller as the persan primarily
responsible for the obligations arising from the Directive.
The central concept is to specify a single persan responsible
to the data subjects, and this in order to facilitate provision
of information to them as weil as to ensure a right of access
and guarantee the effectiveness of the remedies availab-
le.lO
The controller is the persan responsible for the choices de-
termining the definition and implementation of the pro-
cessing, and notthose persans who perform the processing
operations in accordance with instructions from the con-
troller. That is why it is stated thatthe controller defines the
purposes.ll There is no requirement that the controller be
in actual possession of the data; it is the concept of contrai
that is important.
Identification of the "controller" is one of the primary pro-
blems one is faced with when applying the Directive to
open networks characterized by their numerous actors:12
disclosure, or between processing that occurs within or
outside the controlling organization, reflects the changes
i n technology. These changes i ncl ude the fact that operati-
ans can be carried out by different persans at different mo-
ments and in different places, and yet stijl converge to-
wards the realisation of one common purpose.
A common use of the Internet is to transmit, receive and
store messages or sets of structured information (database).
ln the terms of the Directive, therefore, it is feasible to say
that data are being processed.
The use of Internet implies the availability of vastamounts
of information to an innumerable number of persans wish-
ing to consult it. Does each consultation by a user imply
that the data is being "processed"?9 If such is the case, it
will imply that each user of the Internet who cons\Jlts a
Web site which contains personal data, will be considered
as processing the data. The processing of personal data im-
plies a number of obligations incumbent on the controller
and grants a n.umber of ri!?hts for the data subject <f.ee be-
low). Does thls therefore Imply that the user must Inform
the data subjècts that he has consulted a Web site contai-
ning personal information about them? If the data is neither
copied, nor recorded, nor printed what exactly must one
notify to the supervisory authority since the consultation
has left no tangible trace? And how can one grant the data
subject a right of access to information which is at the most
stored in a person's mind? A logical problem therefore
e~ists if one c?nsiders the sole, consultatiC?n of dat ~ s suffi-
clent to constltute the processlng of data ln the ter s of the
directive. A different and more pragmatic approach should
perhaps beadopted.
The enulileration contained in Article l.b is unde~pinned
by a chronological.order in the list of operations retained.
The list begins with the collection of the data and ends with
the destruction of the latter. The consu Itation is not cited at
the start of the article, it does not precede the operation of
collection. On the contrary, it is placed between the retrie-
val, use and disclosureby transmission. It therefore seems
thatthe term "consultation" in the Directive does not cover
the simple reading of data, but rather the offering of data
for consultation.
The definition of processing as covered by the Directive is
sufficiently broad to cover any case in which persona! data
is collected or recorded. ln these two cases, contrary to the
simple consultation, the processing of the data is materiali-
zed. There is therefore no need to regulate cases in which
a simple reading of the data is observed. As soon asthis re-
ading gives rise to the copying, recording, or any other
form of collection or storage of the data, the Directive will
apply.
The consultation of the data can therefore be retained as
part of the processing of data (data which has been collec-
ted, recorded, classified, oreven modified are available for
consultation for example), but one does not need to consi-
der that the simple reading of data without any further ma-
{J Telecommunications organizations provide basic net-
works for data transfer;
0 Access (communications) providers supply services for
storage, transmission and presentation. They are respon-
sibleforthe routing of the message and process traffic data;
0 Information (content) providers supply information sto-
red in files and databases to the users (directory services,
databases, etc.);
0 Service providers offer their servicesto user'; via the Net
(banks, travel agents, etc.);
0 Users access and make use of different Internet services.
These actors are not always clearly identifiable. A same ac-
tor mayoffer different services (telecommunication ser-
vice and access provider 1 for example). The main problem
linked tothe multiplicity of actors is the problem of control
over the information and the flows of datéi and, deriving
from that, the problem of liability.
Recital 47 of the Directive suggests that where a telecom-
munications or electranic mail service is used for the sole
purpose of transmitting messages which contain personal
data, the controller should be the persan from whom the
1
9) Article 2.b.defining the processing of personal data includes as ~rocessing
of personal data, the mere collection or consultation of the data. 1
10) The controller is also responsible for ensuring compliance with the provi-
sions on data quality set out in Paragraph 1 of Article 6. The controller must also
ensure compliance with the obligation to inforrn the data'subJ~t, thus enab-
jing him to effectively exercise his rights. Furthermore, the controller (or his re-
presentative) has the obi igation to notify the supervisory authority pursuant to
Article 18.
11) Commentary on Amended proposai CaM (92) 422 final SYN 287, p. 10.




message originates and not the persan providing the ser-
vice. This persan will be deemed to be the controller only
in respect of any additional personal data processed for the
rendering of the service (traffic data).
This provision must be further examined. A telecommuni-
cations organization or a network access provider will not
be considered the controller as regards information placed
on the network by his clients. This can be ju$tified by the
fact that the telecommunication organization or access
provider does not, and should not, actually process the
persona! data contained in the message by themselves, but
only as a part of the message as a whole. Theydo not actu-
ally define the purposes and means of the processing of the
message or service. They will, however, be regarded as the
controller when processing user-related persCDnal data for
the billing of the service, for example, since in that case
they are processing personal data for a purpose defined by
them.
As regards the other actors involved in the us~ of the Inter-
net, a distinction must be made according t~ the type of
service.
As regards the use of the Internet for the sending of E-mails,
the persan from whom the message originates can be qua-
lified as the "controller". He defines the type of data con-
tained in the message and the purposes for which the data
are sent (message to a colleague in another university
containing information on a common interest). When the
E-mail is used for discussion forums, the controller should
be the entity responsible for centralizing thè applications
to the forum (the moderator of the forum, for example). In-
deed it is this entity which defines the means a;nd purposes
of the forum (a medical institution decides ta create a dis-
cussion forum on a certain type of disease, in order to sti-
mulate scientific discussion on this theme).
~A service provider on the Internet is ta be qu lified as the
controller for the personal information he rovides. He
ought also to be qualified as the controller as regards the
personal data he processes in order to renderthe service.
Indeed he defines the data necessary for the service and
defines the means and purposes of the processing (pro-
cessing of thesender's name and address in order to send
him solicited information or goods).
sarily extracted and assembled in a given spot. The geogra-
phicallocation of the data is no longer of interest in this ca-
se, and it is the controller of the processing who will deter-
mine the applicable law.
The controller must necessa!ily be established on a certain
territory. 141f this territory is that of a MemberState, the na-
tionallaw of the State transposing the Directive will apply
to the processing of data. in the context of activities of the
controller established in the Member State (Article 4.1.a).
If a Danish company opens an Internet site presenting its
staff's personal details, it will need to comply with the Da-
nish data protection law. If a Spanish hotel complex which
offers a reservation system via Internet, requires the inter-
ested parties to introduce their personal data in order to
book a room, the Spanish data protection law, in compli-
ance with the Directive, will apply to the processing of the
data whether it relates to a French; Russian, American, or
Japanese client. '
ln short, aIl the controllers established in the territory of the
European Union will need to comply with the directive, as
implemented by their national law, when they process
personal data.
Controllers established outside the territory of the Union
are not, in principle, covered by the Directive. However,
the European legislator does attempt to address the pro-
blem of the circumvention of the protection afforded by
the Directive by the delocalization of the establishment of
the controller. ln order to avoid such a situation, the text of
the Directive provides that a controller established outside
the Union, but who for purposes of processing of personal
data makes use of equipment, automated or not, situated
on the territory of a Member State, must comply with the
data protection legislation of the said Member State (Artic-
le 4.1.c.).
ln the context of the Internet, such a solution at first sight
appears impractical. It leads to the extension of the appl i-
cation of the Directive to every user of the Internet who
collects personal data for a specific purpose from a data
base or Web site located within the territory of the Union.
Indeed, according to the Directive, it is when one "makes
use", in orderto process personal data, ofequipmentsitua-
ted in a Member State, that the processing is subject to the
law of the said Member State. Yet if it is quite clearthatone
makes use of equipment located on the territory of a Mem-
ber State when one issues a questionnaire in aState in or-
der to obtain personal data on consumer habits or when
one questions the database of the central register of com-
merce of a country in order to obtain the data relating to
the members of a specific sector, it is not easy to locate the
actual equipmentwhich one makes use of in the contextof
the Internet.
The Internet is constituted by information which is not ea-
sily located geographically, even if the persans and sites
are identified by "addresses". These addresses are in fact
keys. The locks behind these keys are, however, not neces-
sarily geographically stable, When an address appears on
a closed network, the site can be "Iodged" anywhere on
anycomputer linked to this network. ln. the contextof a lo-
cal company network, for example, the address of the site
2. Nationallaw applicable
A particular difficulty cao be raised with regard to the ap-
plicability of the Directive. Which activities, carried out in
the context of a global network fall under the scope of the
Directive and must respect ils provisions as transposed by
Member State laws?
The application of a law to a particular situation is usually
determined by the nationality of the actors or the territory
in which the facts occur. However, these crilteria are no
longer applicable in the cyberworld: the reality is transna-
tional, information runs along wires and has no fixed loca-
tion.
The Directive has adopted an interesting approach taking
into account up to a certain point, the developments in
technology. The text no longer focuses on the old notion of
"a filell as mentioned in the original propüs;tion of the Dir-
ective, based on a precise physicallocation of the data (on
a floppy disc, or the hard disc of an identified compu-
ter,...), but rather concentrates on the conceptof'process-
ingll of the data without the need for the data being neces-
14) According to 19 of the recitals, "the establishment on the territory of a
Member State impl ies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable
arrangements", the legal form of such an establishment (branch or subsidiary)
is not a determining factor.
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coulçi correspond to a computer belonging to thedirector
orla the computer consultant. If the internai network links
together addresses dispersed throughout the world, the
electronic address could even correspond to a post in Sin-
gapore or in Venezuela.
ln order to find the corresponding geographicallocation of
a Web site, two solutions are proffered:
0 Either to locate the actual mach ine, the computèr wh ich
ensures the presence of the information on the given site.
However, the information could be kept by an intermedi-
ary whom one has sol icited in order to keep hold of the da-
ta one wishes to offer on the Internet. ln this case, the elec-
tronic address corresponds to a mail box opened for the
occasion, but does not reveal a direct link with the source
of the information.
0 Or to identify the person responsible for providing the
information and to retain his location. Thus if a university
produces on its own Web site a bibliographical database
of the works of its members, one would consider that the
site is located where the university is established.This so-
lution offers the advantage of being coherent with the cri-
teria adopted by the Directive concerning the processing
carried out by controllers located in the territory of the Eu-
ropean Union.
controller and in su ch a case, he must respect European le-
gislation and na me a representative. This scenario is of
course excessive.
The only way in which Article 4.1.c. may be effective is by
giving it a teleological reading. The ratio legis of the article
can be summarized as aimed at avoiding the circumventi-
on of the protection afforded by the European Directive
and, more generally, at avoiding situations where the data
subjects are leh without any protection.15 The aim of the
authors of the Directive is to ensure that the persans who
should normally fall within the scope of the protection of
the Directive, are effectively protected even if outside the
European Union.
A rational solution to the problem of the applicability of
the Directive can be deduced from the joint reading of Art-
icle 4.1.c and Articles 25 and 26 regulating the transfer of
personal data to third countries.
One can consider that a first solution tothe preoccupation
of the authors of the Directive is to b'èfound in the system
put into place as concerns the transfer of data to third
countries (see below). ln the context of the regulation of
these transfers, the requirements laid down by the Europe-
an Directive are to be respected by ail the actors for the
operations carried out on data originating in Europe. An
adequate protection of the data sent outside the borders of
the Union is required.
The dispositions of Article 4.1.C aim at covering situations
in which data subjects are deprived, by an artificial mano-
euvre, of the benefit of the protection afforded by the Di-
rective and situations which fall outside the scope of any
protection whatsoever, even that concerning transborder
data flows.ln this sense, two categories of situations fall, in
our opinion, within the scope of Article 4.1.c:
We must, however, underlinethat it is notalways easyto de-
termine the exact location of the information provider. Yet it
is this location that determines the nationallaw applicable
and the country in which the controller will have to name a
representative. How can one know to which country su ch
existing addresses correspond: 105473.8880@compuser-
ve.com or http://www.telepathic.com? And how cou Id a
persan from Taiwan know whether the town of Gavle
mentioned as the point of location of an information provi-
der is situated in Sweden or in Estonia (or indeed whether
Community law applies)?
Furthermore, in order to locate forums or other e
~ Change
groups one shou Id referto the establ ishment of thecontrol-
1er of the forum.
Once the equipment has been located within the territory
of the European Union, the Directive will apply as soon as
the equipment is used in order to process personaf data. As
al ready mentioned, the term processi ng of personal data as
defined in Article 2.b. of the Directive is very bnoad and
covers a vast number of activities, each one of them could
constitute the "processing" of the data. The very cQPying of
data corresponds tothe collection of the data and is in itself
a processing of personal data according to the Directive.
As a consequence, the persan who, via the Internet, down-
loads personal data from a Web site opened by a servÎce
provider established on the territory of a Member State,
processes the data by making use of equipment situated on
the territory of a Member State. He wi Il be quai ified as the
0 firstly, the situation in which a controller deliberately
seeks to avoid the application of the Directive by delocali-
zing his establishment to a third country, whilst making
use of equipment located within the territory of the Union
in order to process personal data concerning data subjects
located within the Union;
0 secondly, the situation in which the transfer is exclusi-
vely carried out by a controller located in a third country.
This is the case when data is collected through the use of
cookies,16 without the data subject's awareness. Articles
25 and 26will notapply in this casesincethe existing rules
on the transfer of data to third countries only apply if the
sender of the data is located on the territory of the Europe-
an Union. One cannot qualify the person subject to coo-
kies as the sender of data, since the operation is carried out
without his knowledge.ln ordertofill in this gap in the pro-
tection afforded, Article 4.1.c regains its full authority. It is
the full regime of the protection afforded by the Directive
which must apply to the processing of data obtained
through the use of cookies, and not the more flexible re-
gime of the transfer of data to third countries.
The principal criteria, therefore, which aetermines the ap-
plicability of the Directive to controllers situated outside
the territory of the European Union must not be limited to
the use of equipment on the territory of à Member State.
This use is only one element in the analysis of the context
in whiG:h the operations are carried out. A more global ana-
Iysis must be carried out in order to determine thatthe con-
troller is "abnormally" established abroad even though his
activities are mainly centred in Europe, or that one finds
15) See Recitals 20 of the directive" Whereas the fact that the plocessing of
the data is carried out by a person established in a third country mllst notstand
in the way of the protection of individuals provided for in this directive;..." and
the Explanatory Memorandum" (Article 4) lays down the connecting factors
which determine which nationallaw is applicable to processinfwithin the
scope of the Directive in order to avoid Iwo possibilities: that the data subject
might find himself outside any system of protection, and parttcularly that the
law might be circumvented in order to achieve this;(...). CaM (92) 422 final-
SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 13.
16) Cookie is a Netscapefeature thatassists providers in tracking ~sers activi-
ties at Web sites. It enables the retrieval of information stored on tlle computer
of the Internet ~ser, most of the time without his knowledge.
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oneself in the presence of a situation lacking any prote~-
tion whatsoever.
A German pharmaceutical company which establishes it-
self in Budapest and which collects data relating to medic-
al prescriptions from a pharmaceutical network located
within a Member State, in order to target Eurdpean health
professionals, is evidently trying to circumvent the provisi-
ons of the Directive and Article 4.1.c. should apply.
Similarly a company which collects data relating to the use
of credit cards by Europeans in Europe (shopping in Paris,
cinema in London, restaurant in Milan, etcj afld which
sends the data to its subsidiary in the US in orderto process
it to obtain complete personal profiles of credjt card users
in Europe, should also fall under Article 4.1.c. The same is
not true of an individual who, in order to obtai:n informati-
on necessary for his profession, accesses from the US a
Web page issued by a provider situated within the Com-
munity.17
3. Transfer of Persona/ Data to Third Countries (Articles
25 and 26)
The Internet facilitates the quick transmission of great
quantities of information to any other comp!uter system
connected to the network. Persona! data can be communi-
cated to countries without any data protection where!hey
can be accessed from ail over the world.
The Directive envisages the question of the trahsfer of per-
sonal data to countries outside the European 4nion in Art-
icles 25 and 26. The aim of the Directive is do!.Jble: firstly,
the efforts put into place to afford a !evel of pr()tection wi-
thin the Union wou Id be useless if one could clrcumvent it
by transferring the data to a country offering no guarantees
to the data subject. Secondly, the free movemE!ntof perso-
na! data within the Union supposes thatthe Member States
adopt common rules as regards the flows of data outside
the Union. The Directive, therefore, provides for a regime
prohibiting the transfers to countries which donot offer an
adequate level of protection.
The adequacy of the level of protection shall be assessed in
the light of ail the circumstances surrounding the transfer
operations. T 0 measure the degree of danger the flow pre-
sents, consideration will be given to the nature of the data,
the purpose and duration of the proposed processing ope-
ration or operations, the country of origin and country of fin-
al destination. Furthermore, in order to assess the level of
protection afforded in the third country, one will take into
account the rules of law, bath general and sectoral in force
in the third country in question and the professional rules
and security measures which are complied with in that
country (Article 25.2).
Open networks such as the Internet pose a particular pro-
blem with regard to the European transborder data flows
policy.
The Internet is the scene of active and passive transborder
flows. Active transborder flows mean conscious flows, de-
cided, spontaneously or on request, by the data subject
himself or by the controller. For example a Belgian citizen
gives his name and address to a Canadian service provider,
an Italian bank transfers information to the USA in order to
make a payment for its customer, a subsidiary company
sends the personnel file to the head office located in Japan,
a French service provider sells his clientele file to a Norwe-
gian marketing company, etc. Active flows also cover hid-
den flows. These concern the "user's data", the electronic
trace 1eft wh en using the Net, already mentioned above,
and also the data discretely collected by cookies. Flows
can also be passive, that is to'say that the data is made
available on a site and is liable to be accessed by anyone
located anywhere, copied and by this fact transferred to
any third country. Flows are passive in the sense that they
are potential.
The evaluation of the level of protection afforded by the
third country must take place prior to the flow:
a) Article 25: The Principles
Article 25.1 provides that transfers of personal data to third
countries may only take place if, on the on~ hand, the
transfer complies with the national provisions adopted
pursuant to the Directive and if the country of destination
ensures an adequate level of protection.
The notion of "adequate" protection is to be link~d to the de-
gree of risk a transfer presents. When envisaging the transfer
of a list of sexual delinquents to a social association or a list
of the membersof a political partytoadirectmanketingcom-
pany, one must be severe in assessing the adequacy of the
protection offered abroad. If, on the other hand, data su ch as
name, position and length of service of employ~es are sent
from the subsidiary company to the parent com~any, the le-
vel of protection will be more easily satisfactory.
The notion of adequacy calls for a functional approach. It
implies a search for the fundamental elements of the pro-
tection and not a will to export the European legislative
model. The protection must beadequateJy.mforded, what-
ever the form it takes. Specific data protection IlO'gisfation is
not the sole instrument to take into account. For example,
the rules governing medical secrecy canbe retained as a
part of the protection structure.
D ln presence of a conscious active flow, the assessment
of the protection is not specific to the use of a network ra-
ther than other means of transfer. As in a classical environ-
ment, one intends to send data to a given country and con-
sequently evaluates the protection this country offers to
personal data. Most of the time, this hypothesis corre-
sponds to one of the exceptions admitted by Article 26.1
examined below: either the data subject gives his unambi-
guous consent to the transfer, or the flow is necessary for
the performance of a contract between the data subject
and the sender of the data or concluded in the interest of
the data subject between the controller and a third party.
However, in the first case one must be surethatthe consent
is freely given and fully informed. This means that the data
subject must have knowledge of the country to which his
data are sent and of the fact that this country does not offer
an adequate level of protection. Let us recall that the real
difficulty that sometimes appears is to determine to which
country one really sends the data (because of nonrevealing
Web site or E-mail addresses as illustrated above). ln the
case of a contract between the data subject and the sender
of the data, one must contrai the real necessity of the trans-
fer.
D As concerns hidden flows, one has-to distinguish two
hypotheses. The first concerns the category of hidden
flowsderiving from cookies. Cookies can operate a discre-
te collection of data in Europe. This means that a flow of
17) The rules goveming transborder data flows will apply in this case (see be-
low).
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this country can happen not to satisfy the criteria as con-
cerns the medical or marketing sectors.
b) Article 26: Exceptions
By way of derogation from the prohibition enacted in Ar-
ticle 25, Article 26 lays down a number of derogations
enabling the transfer of persona! data to countries which
do not provide for an adequate level of protection. Thus
the transfer may take place if the data subject has given his
unambiguous consent to the proposed transfer (the con-
sent must be freely given, specific and informed see ab-
ove); if necessary for the performance of a con tract or if ne-
cessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject.
The transfer of personal data via the Internet to a third
country could take place with the consent of the data sub-
ject when publicizing data concerning him abroad. He
must, however, be made fully aware that his data will be
transferred to a country which does not afford adequate
protection and of the risks that this could imply.
Transfer of personal data could also take place if necessary
for a contract to which the data subject is party (an indivi-
dual ordering goods in a third country for example will im-
~y the transfer of the necessary data to providethe goodsto 
him: name, address, credit card number etc.): Only that
data necessary for the performance of the contract must be
transmitted. Furthermore, the data subject should be made
aware that once the data has been transferred to the third
country for the con tract in question, there are no means of
ensuring that the data will not be further used for other pur-
poses (sold to a marketing company, for example or used
by the controller to establish personal profiles).
Transfer of data may also occur if it is necessary for the
conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the
interest of the data subject between the controller and a
third party. This is notably the case when a travel agency
makes a hotel reservation in the context of ahol iday book-
ing for one of its clients.
According to Article 26.2., the transfer of personal data
may also take place if the controller adduces adequate sa-
feguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals notably
through the use of contractual clauses. Even if it is true that
contractual solutions could be a way ofaffording a certain
level of protection to the data subject, they could be pro-
blematic in complex information processing networks
such as the Internet with multiple parties involved especi-
ally in jurisdictions where the individuals concerned do
not have legal rights against third parties.
data occurs, but because the data subject ignores itlhe can-
not be considered as the sender of the data. As ~ conse-
quence, this operation is to be defined not as a transfer, but
as a collection made by the recipient of the data. As the
controllerofthe processing (collectingdata corresponds to
a processing) is established outside Europe, but makes use
of equipment situated on the territory of a Member 5tate
(when visiting the system of the data subject), Artic:le 4.1.c
will apply to the processing.24 The controller must therefo-
re comply with ail the rules provided for in the Directive.
Notably, since the Community text prohibits occult pro-
cessi ng of data, the controller wi Il have to inform the data
subject of the processing he operates on the data. 1
The second hypothesis concerns the electronic trace left
when visiting a Web site. Even if this trace is convertible in-
to personal data, it is not to be considered as a tran$fer sin-
ce the data subject remains unaware of the flow of Ihis per-
sonal information. If the controller located outsideEurope
processes this data, Articles 25 and 26 will not apf1lly and,
in this case, Article 4.1.c will not apply either since the
controller is liable to argue that he does not need to "make
use of equipment situated on the territory of a Member 5ta-
te'l to obtain such data: he only records the data arriving at
his site. The data subject is thus left withoutany protection
as concerns the trace he leaves behind. 50 the only soluti-
on in this case is to warn users of the risks of processing be-
yond their knowledge.
0 Finally, as concerns passive flows the obligation to evalu-
ate the foreign protection prior to the flow means that such
an evaluation must be done in advance for ail corllnected
countries since every country is a potential destination for
the information avai lable on the Net. If a country does not
offer an adequate protection for personal data, açcess to
the data should be refused to this country, or at least the
possibility of downloading the data ortransferring it in any
otherway. One sees in the context of the Internet, t~e prac-
tical difficulty raised if one attempts to respect the provisi-
on of the Directive as regards transborder data f.lows to
third countries.
The difficulty is even more serious when one considers the
type of evaluation required by the Directive. The adequa-
cy of the level of protection must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, keeping in mind ail circumstances surrounding
a given flow. Article 25.2 does not provide for general sta-
tements.25 A third country can be considered as satisfying
the conditions as concerns the financial sector or the re-
search activities sector because of specific sectorallegisla-
tion or codes of conduct, for example, and at the sa e time
24) See above our reading of Article 4.1.c of the Direçtive. 1
25) Articles 25 (4) and (6), however, provide that the Commissio~can ufind
(...) that a third country (does or) does not ensure an adequate levelof protec-
tion ..."
